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Abstract 
This study aims to explore the effects of: (1) the project characteristics of asset specificity, uncertainty 
and complexity on the performance of, and, the use of formal and social controls in inter-firm innovation 
projects, and, (2) the use of formal and social controls on the performance of inter-firm innovation 
projects. In addition, the mediating role of the use of formal and social controls in the relationships 
between the characteristics and performance of inter-firm innovation projects is also examined. Survey 
data from 75 organisations in innovation-active industries in Australia were analysed using the structural 
equation modelling with the Partial Least Square technique. The results show that uncertainty and 
complexity affected performance of inter-firm innovation projects, but in opposite directions. Higher 
levels of uncertainty were associated with less use of social controls but higher levels of complexity were 
partnered with a greater use of both formal and social controls. The use of formal and social controls 
individually impacted on inter-firm innovation project performance. Finally, the use of formal and social 
controls played a partial mediating role in the relationships of uncertainty and complexity with inter-firm 
innovation performance. Responding to gaps in research, this study clarifies that asset specificity may be 
irrelevant whilst uncertainty and complexity may be highly relevant in the performance of, and, the use of 
controls in inter-firm innovation projects. The study offers valuable insights into how a complementary 
use of controls contributes to the performance of inter-firm innovation projects. 
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This study aims to explore the effects of: 1) the project characteristics of asset specificity, uncertainty 
and complexity on the performance of, and, the use of formal and social controls in inter-firm innovation 
projects, and, 2) the use of formal and social controls on the performance of inter-firm innovation 
projects. In addition, the mediating role of the use of formal and social controls in the relationships 
between the characteristics and performance of inter-firm innovation projects is also examined. Survey 
data from 75 organizations in innovation–active industries in Australia were analysed using the 
structural equation modelling with the Partial Least Square technique. The results show that uncertainty 
and complexity affected performance of inter-firm innovation projects, but in opposite directions. 
Higher levels of uncertainty were associated with less use of social controls but higher levels of 
complexity were partnered with a greater use of both formal and social controls. The use of formal and 
social controls individually impacted on inter-firm innovation project performance. Finally, the use of 
formal and social controls played a partial mediating role in the relationships of uncertainty and 
complexity with inter-firm innovation performance. Responding to gaps in research, this study clarifies 
that asset specificity may be irrelevant whilst uncertainty and complexity may be highly relevant in the 
performance of, and, the use of controls in inter-firm innovation projects. The study offers valuable 
insights into how a complementary use of controls contributes to the performance of inter-firm 
innovation projects.      
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Innovation is a process whereby organizations transform ideas into new or improved 
products, service or processes in order to advance, compete and differentiate themselves 
successfully in the marketplace (Baragheh, et al., 2009; Dodgson et al., 2002). Innovation 
m a y be more severe and difficult to control than other organizational processes and 
transactions because of its characteristics of newness and change (Kerssens-van Drongelen 
and Bilderbeek, 2009; Zhao, 2003). It is about “taking advantage of exceptions; 
experimenting, failing and succeeding; uncertainty and volatility; inefficiencies; adapting 
to unforeseen opportunities; and foremost creativity” (Davila et al., 2009, p.285). Whilst 
innovation has typically been seen to occur within the boundaries of an organization, the 
manner in which many organizations innovate has changed as it has moved from a closed to 
an open process (Bigliardi et al., 2010; Chesbrough, 2003). Through inter-firm innovations, 
organizations actively cooperate with external actors to compensate for their scarce internal 
resources and limited competencies (Lichtenthaler, 2008; Baum et al., 2000).  
But inter-firm collaborations expose firms to risks of appropriation and performance (Rosell, 
2014; Das and Teng, 2001). The reliance on external parties can be problematic because key 
areas of expertise of a collaborator may be gradually appropriated by the other partner. 
One might also discover that a partner does not have the competency to ensure a successful 
innovation outcome. Arguably, inter-firm innovations are generally higher risk projects than 
intra-firm innovations and other types of inter-organizational collaborations. They present a 
paradox for organizations and scholars: while one wants to actively cooperate to transform 
ideas into cutting-edge or better products, services or processes, one also must guard against the 
possibility that expertise and competitive advantage may be lost. Crucially, the benefits gained 




conscious management action (Mohr and Sengupta, 2004). According to Crossan and Inkpen 
(1995), maximizing the value of inter-firm innovation necessitates that organizations put in 
place suitable control mechanisms. Controls help minimize appropriation and performance 
risks (Miller et al., 2011; Hoecht and Trott, 2006) by creating ample space for both the 
‘firmness and flexibility’  required in inter-firm innovations (van der Meer-Kooistra and 
Scapens, 2008). They also assist in coordinating interdependent tasks (Rosell, 2014; Dekker, 
2004), which are characteristic of inter-firm innovations. Notably, there are few studies that 
have investigated the use of controls to manage the dual challenge of cooperation and 
coordination in inter-firm collaborative innovation projects (Rosell, 2014). The lack of 
research may be reflective of a view in the innovation management literature that formal 
management control mechanisms constrain, or at worst are irrelevant to, product 
development (e.g. Verona, 1999; Dougherty and Hardy, 1996). However, there has been a 
growing acknowledgement that successful innovations require organizational mechanisms 
(Bharadwaj and Menon, 2000). There are scholars like Hansen and Jönsson (2005), and, 
Davila (2000) who propose that formal control mechanisms could enable innovation. 
Mouritsen et al. (2009) for instance, suggest that these control mechanisms encourage and 
ensure that innovation projects are aligned with the strategic intent of organizations.    
This study draws from the theory of transaction cost economics to begin to identify that the 
project characteristics of asset specificity, uncertainty and complexity are highly relevant in 
helping understand how to manage appropriation and performance risks in inter-firm 
innovations (see Williamson, 1985). This study also adopts a contingency-based framework 
to propose links between these characteristics, on the one hand, and the use of controls in, 
and, performance of inter-firm projects, on the other hand. A contingency framework 
implicates contextual variables in the design of effective controls and performance. This 




organizational theory (Chenhall, 2006). According to Chenhall (2006, p.164), theorists such 
as Burns and Stalker (1961), Perrow (1970), Thompson (1967), Lawrence & Lorsch (1967) 
and Galbraith (1973) focused on the impact of environment and technology on organizational 
structure. Early accounting researchers then drew on this work to investigate the importance 
of environment, technology, structure and size to the design of management control systems. 
This study adopts this approach to link risk factors with management control mechanisms and 
project performance.       
This study seeks to address areas which have received minimal attention so far, including firstly 
how risk factors influence the use of controls in, and, performance of inter-firm innovation 
projects (McCarthy and Gordon, 2011; Dekker, 2004). The second gap is identified by Ding 
and colleagues (2013) who observed there are only a few studies that examine the link 
between management controls and inter-firm collaboration performance. Finally, this study 
seeks to address the equivocal position in the literature on the individual effects of two 
types of management controls namely, formal and social controls, on innovation 
performance (Bisbe and Otley, 2004). 
This study thus has two aims. The first aim is to examine the impact of in t er - f i rm 
innovat ion  project risks, operationalized as asset specificity, uncertainty and complexity, 
on the use of formal and social controls in, and the performance of, inter-firm innovation 
projects. The second aim is to assess the influence of formal and social controls on 
innovation project performance. The study contributes to the literature on the management of 
inter-firm innovation projects in two ways. Firstly, it fosters a deep understanding of the link 
between innovation project characteristics which indicate risks, on the one hand, and the use 
of controls and inter-firm innovation project performance, on the other hand (Davila et al., 
2009). According to Gasmann (2006), the opening up of the innovation process requires 




instead of at an organizational level is salient because of the temporal nature of projects. 
Projects are claimed to require more interpersonal and less formal processes of coordination 
(Janowicz-Panjaitan et al., 2009). Interestingly, the same view on the use of controls in 
temporal projects can be applied to the management of innovation risks, where it is argued 
that the use of formal controls is less suitable but more amenable to the use of social controls 
(Hoecht and Trott, 2006). Secondly, the study tests an under investigated postulate that the 
use of management controls contribute to better performance of inter-firm collaborations 
(Dekker et al., 2013; Ding et al., 2013). Thus, the study also explores consequences of the 
use of inter-firm innovation controls on performance.          
The remainder of the paper has 4 sections. Section 2 presents the literature review and 
hypotheses development. Sections 3 and 4 provide the research method and findings. Section 
5 concludes with a discussion of the implications of the findings, limitations of the study and 
areas for further research. 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
 
2.1 Project characteristics of asset specificity, uncertainty and complexity, 
and, project performance  
 
This study draws on the theory of transaction cost economics (TCE) to highlight the risks 
that inter-firm innovation projects have. TCE focuses on the potential downsides of 
cooperation while the resource-based view of the firm emphasizes the upside of cooperation 
(Finch et al., 2015). Crucially, TCE adopts a passive risk management perspective with a 
focus on pre-calculation of risk arising from partners’ opportunistic behaviours and bounded 
rationality (Anderson and Dekker, 2009).  In so doing, it allows a considered response to the 
question of how organizations could manage the paradox of inter-firm innovations.  




identified three project properties namely asset specificity, uncertainty and complexity of 
transactions as potentially helping explain the appropriation and performance risks of inter-
firm innovation projects (Dekker, 2004; Williamson, 1985). It is worth noting that while 
TCE lists asset specificity and uncertainty, it also includes the factor of frequency. The 
innovation literature, however, characterizes the innovation process with uncertainty and 
complexity (Triguero and Córcoles, 2013). Moreover, the definitions and operationalization 
of the construct of uncertainty in the accounting and innovation literatures are not identical 
and overlap with those of frequency, as defined by TCE, and, complexity. In the accounting 
literature uncertainty is linked to the environment and technology (Ditillo, 2004). Various 
authors then include and place differing emphases on elements of dynamism, 
heterogeneity, predictability and controllability in regard to environmental uncertainty, and, 
on task uncertainty, complexity and interdependence when referring to the degree of 
technological uncertainty. In the innovation literature a common definition of complexity 
is in the anthropological sense of increasing differentiation and specialization in structure 
combined with increasing integration of parts (Tainter, 1988). In light of the overlaps and 
varied emphases in definitions, this study examines the factors of asset specificity and 
uncertainty as operationalized and used in the accounting literature (and drawing from 
TCE), and complexity as generally understood in the innovation literature (noting 
definitional overlaps with TCE). Particularly on uncertainty, it is the element of 
predictability of the environment which is the interest of the study.   
Asset specificity relates to the dedicated investments in inter-firm innovation projects. As 
noted by Langfield-Smith (2008, p.346) who referred to the work by Williamson (1991) and 
Nooteboom (2004), asset specificity can take several forms: site or location specificity, 
physical assets specificity, human assets specificity (training, knowledge), brand name 




little alternative use of these investments outside the project resulting in a high level of 
bilateral dependency between parties (David and Han, 2004). It also results in a heightened 
level of appropriation risk by the partner, which could then severely impact on the 
performance of innovation projects (Dekker, 2004). Appropriation risk is explained by TCE 
as emanating from opportunistic partners who will pursue their self-interests.  
A high level of uncertainty translates into a low level of predictability of the market and 
customer technical requirements of inter-firm innovation projects. Higher uncertainty 
implies that inter-firm innovation teams will find it more difficult to design a product, 
service or process that will satisfy market requirements. In addition to being self-interested 
and opportunistic, TCE also depicts human beings as having bounded rationality. Economic 
decision-making whilst intentionally rational is limited by “experience cognitive 
constraints”, which include limited information, lack of knowledge and information-
processing capabilities (Vosselman & van der Meer-Kooistra, 2006). The higher level of 
unpredictability and the limited ability of partners to effectively deal with it, reduces the 
likelihood that the innovation project will succeed in the market or in its implementation in 
an organization resulting in poorer project outcomes (Tatikonda and Rosenthal, 2000), that 
is, performance risk.  
Complexity is explained in terms of novelty of the technology (Carbonell and 
Rodriguez, 2006), the number and level of skills required, and the extent of integration 
and interaction involved with the skills and functions (Chapman and Hyland, 2004). 
Practitioners describe an innovation project as having a high level of technology risk when, 
at the beginning of the project, they do not fully understand the technology, hence do not 
know the exact means to accomplish the project (Tatikonda and Rosenthal, 2000). This is 
expected using TCE as a framework because human actors are assumed to have bounded 




probability of negative task outcomes. But Tatikonda and Rosenthal (2000) found that that 
use of higher levels of new technology actually results in greater achievement of the 
innovation performance objectives. They attribute this finding, in regard to new product 
developments, to firms often under anticipating the technical performance capabilities of 
new technology employed to develop a new product. As for other factors impacting on 
complexity, the extent of integration and interaction involved with the skills and 
functions are also depicted as contributing to task uncertainty resulting in unsatisfactory 
project outcomes, in particular development times or time-to-market (Griffin, 1997; Meyer 
and Utterback, 1995). Hence overall we propose the following set of hypotheses: 
H1a. Asset specificity is negatively associated with the performance of inter-firm innovation 
projects. 
H1b. Uncertainty is negatively associated with the performance of inter-firm innovation 
projects. 
H1c. Complexity is negatively associated with the performance of inter-firm innovation 
projects. 
2.2 Project characteristics of asset specificity, uncertainty and complexity, and, the use of 
formal and social controls 
Researchers seem to accept that innovation is a phenomenon that can be subjected to human 
control perhaps because it is considerably affected by human interaction (Hoecht and Trott, 
2006). The discussion in this section takes both a TCE and a contingency approach to link the 
project characteristics of asset specificity, uncertainty and complexity with the use of 
management control mechanisms. Management controls are said to minimize innovation 
risks (Han et al., 2008) and are important in maintaining and developing inter-firm 
collaboration (Kang et al., 2014). They are designed to assist collaborating organizations to 
regulate themselves (Otley et al., 1995) in uncertain settings (Gordon and Narayanan, 1984). 
Indeed Simons (1987) found that organizations that pursued innovation and growth 




Bisbe and Otley (2004) thereafter demonstrated that the interactive use of formal 
controls impacted on organizational capabilities to innovate and on organizational 
performance.  
Management control systems are defined as a set of different procedures and processes 
to ensure achievement of management and organizational goals (Otley and Berry, 1994). 
These systems provide information which can be used for decision making, planning, 
controlling and evaluation (Merchant and Otley, 2007). Controls have been categorized 
as formal and informal controls (Kirsch, 1997; Anthony et al., 1989); output and behavior 
controls (Ouchi, 1977); market, bureaucracy and clan controls (Ouchi, 1979); 
administrative and social controls (Hopwood, 1976), and results, action and personnel 
controls (Merchant, 1985). In this study controls are categorized as formal and social 
controls, a classification used in studies of Australian inter- firm collaborations, a context 
shared h e r e  (Giacobbe and Booth, 2009; Langfield-Smith, 2008; Mahama, 2006). Formal 
controls specify contractual obligations and explicitly designed organizational mechanisms 
to manage inter-firm collaboration (Dekker, 2004; Langfield-Smith and Smith, 2003). 
They help organizations and their members focus on final outcomes and prescribe the 
appropriate behavior to achieve these outcomes (Vélez et al., 2008; Dekker, 2004; Das and 
Teng, 2001). Social controls cover informal cultures and systems, communication, 
socialization and self-regulation (Mahama, 2006; Dekker, 2004). They assist in increasing 
relationship commitment, reducing goal incongruence and establishing a compatible set of 
values between collaborating partners (Mahama, 2006; Das and Teng, 2001). According to 
relationship marketing theory, there should be facilitative mechanisms to help collaborators 
develop a competence in managing inter-organizational relationships. Simonin (1997), for 
instance, states that learning how to collaborate assists in successful relationships. In this 




the relationship, which then results in the collaborators increasing the likelihood of positive 
project outcomes.               
As indicated earlier, a high degree of asset specificity signifies little alternative use of 
resources beyond the project leading to parties being highly dependent on each other (David 
and Han, 2004). This scenario exemplifies the inter-firm innovation paradox for organizations 
and scholars. The use of resources including human assets (training, knowledge) solely for 
an inter-firm innovation project is equated with a situation where a party will be 
accorded exclusive access to the other party’s highly specialized expertise thereby 
potentially fulfilling an aim of inter-collaborative projects of gaining new or better 
expertise. However, according to TCE, this exclusive access to highly specialized resources 
also creates appropriation risk.  
The potential risk triggers a safeguarding of investments through controls. According to 
TCE, the bounded rationality of partners results in incomplete contracts and formal 
controls. So while formal controls may be useful, on their own they are insufficient to 
mitigate appropriation risk. Hence, social controls must be used in conjunction with 
formal controls to allow further monitoring and curbing of the partner’s potential 
opportunistic behavior arising from a high degree of asset specificity (Gulati and Singh, 
1998). In addition the role of social controls in encouraging a commitment to the 
relationship means that efforts will be expended to achieve project outcomes.   
Uncertainty also presents a challenge for rational decision-making. Further, unpredictability 
of market and customer technical requirements means that it will be difficult to establish 
clear specifications, goals and outcomes (Kang et al., 2014; Dekker, 2004), thus 
presumably resulting in reliance on b o t h  formal and social controls. Contracts, as earlier 
noted, are inherently incomplete not only because of the bounded rationality of contracting 




combine to create contracts that cannot pre-specify every future contingency. Arguably, 
innovations, which require adapting to many unforeseen opportunities and challenges 
(Davila et al., 2009), are imbued with compounded uncertainty. This characteristic of 
innovations make the use of contracts useful (Dekker, 2004) but if used solely may be 
ineffective in dealing with uncertainty. Van der Meer-Kooistra and Scapens (2015) identify 
the need for a social structure to compensate for the limitations of incomplete contracts and 
other formal modes of control. A social structure is concerned with the day-to-day activities 
of the innovation process and includes team-based structures and regular meetings which 
enable collaborating parties to communicate with each other. Information sharing allows 
parties to make sense of an unpredictable context (Revilla and Knoppen, 2015). In addition, 
Speklé (2001) advises that when confronted with high uncertainty, firms through the use of 
social controls, strive to establish a situation of commitment and congruency to achieve 
desired outcomes. The push to create commitment from transacting parties is also necessary 
to counter their opportunistic and self-interested tendencies. Thus overall, in conditions of 
high uncertainty, successful organizations use a combination of formal and social controls 
(Chenhall and Morris, 1995). 
In a comprehensive review of literature on management control systems in innovation 
companies, Haustein et al. (2014) deduce that in conditions of a high level of complexity, it 
will become very difficult to express the outcome of transformation processes in numbers. 
An impersonal mode of coordination by rules, procedures, plans and schedules may be 
challenging to implement (Abernethy and Brownell, 1997; Chapman, 1997; Van de Ven et 
al., 1976). Indeed, Van de Ven et al. (1976) propose that more personal and group- based 
modes of coordination will also be required. Despite their opportunistic leanings, employees 
need to be fully committed to their specific roles (Wilkins and Ouchi, 1983), and, social 




opportunities for creativity and the free flow of ideas particularly because there is a variety of 
skills and functions involved (Burns and Stalker, 1961). Social controls resulting in effective 
communication also allows the sharing of domain specific knowledge (e.g., knowledge about 
technology) (Rundquist, 2012). 
Indeed Dekker (2004) drawing from Borys and Jemison (1989), does not think that 
organizations should choose between formal or social controls. Instead he proposes that a 
higher level of interdependence requires more sophisticated coordination mechanisms than 
that of a set of a low level of formal controls and a high level of social controls. In Dekker’s 
case, interdependence is a function of the number of skills required, and the extent of 
integration and interaction involved with the skills and functions. His findings resonate in 
this study because these elements partly determine the level of complexity of innovation 
projects. He finds in his research that a combination of formal and informal control 
mechanisms was mobilised. The former included budgeting and performance evaluation and 
measurement, and, the latter involved joint interaction and problem solving, and, 
communication. Hence we propose the following set of hypotheses: 
H2a. Asset specificity is positively associated with the use of formal controls in inter-firm 
innovation projects. 
H2b. Asset specificity is positively associated with the use of social controls in inter-firm 
innovation projects. 
H2c. Uncertainty is positively associated with the use of formal controls in inter- firm 
innovation projects. 
H2d. Uncertainty is positively associated with the use of social controls in inter- firm 
innovation projects. 
H2e.  Complexity is positively associated with the use of formal controls in inter-firm 
innovation projects. 
H2f.  Complexity is positively associated with the use of social controls in inter-firm 
innovation projects. 




Formal controls help ensure that innovative ideas are translated into effective innovations 
and enhance performance (Chenhall and Morris, 1995). However, they are also viewed as 
incompatible with innovation because they can deter creativity and may not be able 
to adequately cope with the uncertainty inherent in innovations (Amabile, 1998). But 
formal controls do coexist with innovation (Ezzamel, 1990). Notably, the most innovative 
firms are intensive users of formal controls (Simons, 1995). In regard to social controls, 
Hoecht and Trott (2006) posit that they are more effective than formal controls in 
managing innovation risks. The social interconnectedness in inter-firm innovation 
relationships (Baraldi and Strőmsten, 2009) highlights the primacy of people in 
innovation success and therefore the need for more communication to cultivate 
commitment (Soutar and McNeil, 1993), helping improve innovation performance 
(Rundquist, 2012). Thus overall, different types of controls perform specific roles in 
helping attain success in inter-firm innovation (Davila, 2005). Hence, the use of a 
combination of controls is proposed as being more effective in achieving innovation goals 
than the use of a single type of control (Chen et al., 2009). In the case of intra-firm 
innovations, Bisbe and Malagueño (2009) make a similar observation that an 
organization’s ability to either curb innovation excesses or encourage innovativeness may 
depend on the activation of diverse forms of control, to create a complementary fit. 
Therefore the following set of hypotheses is proposed:   
H3a. The use of formal controls is positively associated with the performance of inter-firm 
innovation projects. 
H3b. The use of social controls is positively associated with the performance of inter-firm 
innovation projects. 
 
2.4 The mediating effect of formal and social controls 
 
The set of hypotheses from H2a to H2f suggests a direct link between asset specificity, 




other hand. H3a and H3b also predict a positive link between the use of formal and social and 
inter-firm innovation projects performance. Hence overall these hypotheses suggest a 
mediating role for the use of formal and social controls in the proposed link between the 
characteristics and performance of inter-firm innovation projects as captured in the first set of 
hypotheses (H1a – H1c). Therefore, collectively the following hypotheses are proposed: 
H4a. The relationship between asset specificity and the performance of inter-firm 
innovation projects is mediated by the use of formal controls. 
H4b. The relationship between uncertainty and the performance of inter-firm innovation 
projects is mediated by the use of formal controls. 
H4c. The relationship between complexity and the performance of inter-firm innovation 
projects is mediated by the use of formal controls. 
H4d. The relationship between asset specificity and the performance of inter-firm innovation 
projects is mediated by the use of social controls. 
H4e. The relationship between uncertainty and the performance of inter-firm innovation 
projects is mediated by the use of social controls. 
H4f. The relationship between complexity and the performance of inter-firm innovation 
projects is mediated by the use of social controls. 
 
 











3. Research method 
 
Data were collected through a self-administrated paper-based survey from a sample of 
senior managers who acted as primary liaison officers for organizations engaged in inter-
firm innovations. The targeted organizations were randomly selected from large 
companies1
 
in OneSource database from the wholesale trade, retail trade, information 
                                                          
1 A large company is defined as one that meets at least one of three criteria: (1) having revenue for the financial 
year that is $25 million or more; (2) having gross assets with a value of $12.5 million or more of at the end of 




media and telecommunications, professional, scientific and technical services and 
manufacturing industries. More than 45.2% of businesses in these industries were 
reported as innovation–active businesses in the 2010-11 Innovation in Australian 
Business Survey (IABS) (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2013). To ensure that we sent 
the questionnaires to relevant organizations and knowledgeable staff and therefore improve 
the quality of responses, telephonic recruitment was undertaken to identify potential 
survey respondents. The final sample of survey participants met the criteria of their 
organizations having been involved in at least one inter-firm innovation in the last three 
years, of being the knowledgeable staff, and, expressing interest in participating in the 
study. As a result, 317 questionnaires were distributed and 75 valid responses were 
received. Thus, the final response rate is 24%. 
As reported in Table 1, 66% of the respondents were members of top management, 
including CEOs, CFOs and directors, and 31% were functional managers, such as 
general managers and operations managers. Majority (65%) of the respondents had 
worked with the organization for more than 10 years. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
3.1 Instrument design 
To fine-tune the instrument, a pilot test was conducted with three expert academics 
resulting in minor modifications to the survey instrument.2 All items on the constructs of 
asset specificity, uncertainty and complexity were measured using a seven-point Likert scale 
ranging from 1 = very low to 7 = very high.  For measurement of formal and social controls, 
the respondents were asked to rate their use of these controls on a seven-point Likert scale 
with 1 = never used to 7 = often used. Innovation performance was also measured on a 
                                                          




seven-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree. A 
summary of all variables descriptions is provided in an Appendix. 
Asset specificity was measured using six items which were adapted and modified based 
on Dekker (2008), Geyskens et al. (2006), and Heide and John (1990).3 The respondents 
were asked to rate the degree in which human capital (e.g. training, knowledge), brand 
name, equipment and other physical assets, site or facilities, tailored procedures and routines 
can be redeployed outside a particular innovation. If the possibility of redeployment is high, 
there is low asset specificity. Consistent with extant literature, the measurement items 
consists of human assets specificity (training, knowledge), brand name or reputational 
capital, physical assets specificity, site or location specificity, and dedicated capacity 
(Langfield-Smith, 2008). They all relate to transaction-specific assets used for an innovation 
project (Geyskens et al., 2006). All the items are well above the cut-off of 0.50 suggested by 
Bisbe and Otley (2004) and one factor solution can explain 59.23% of common variance for 
this construct. 
Uncertainty is defined as the inability of the firm to accurately forecast the external 
environment, technical requirements, and market and industry changes in the context of a 
particular inter-firm innovation, which captures the elements of environmental, 
technological and behavioral uncertainties suggested by Geyskens et al. (2006). There 
were seven items, which were adapted and modified from Dekker (2008), Geyskens et al. 
(2006), and Heide and John (1990). All seven items loaded well on one factor and 
explained 64% of common variance for uncertainty. 
Complexity measures the degree of the newness of the technology (technological 
                                                          
3 One global indicator was also used for all reflective constructs to test the correlation of individual items to this 
global item. The results showed high levels of correlation between individual and global items. The global items 




complexity), the number and level of skills or functions required, the extent of 
interactions among different skills or functions (organizational complexity), and the extent 
of integration required (development complexity). There were seven items adapted from 
Dekker (2008), and, Kim and Wilemon (2003). Factor analysis revealed that all items 
loaded on a single factor with 66.75% common variance explained. 
The use of formal and social controls was measured as two formative constructs, as 
these two variables consist of different “inherent constitutive facets” (Bisbe et al., 2007) of 
control mechanisms. Most of the indicators used to measure these two constructs were 
based on Giacobbe and Booth (2009), Kamminga and van der Meer-Kooistra (2007), and 
Chalos and O’Connor (2004). Formal controls consist of contracts, planning and budgeting, 
standardised procedures and rules, formal project methodology (e.g. PRINCE2, 
PIMBOK, AGILE, SCRUM), performance evaluation and management reports. Social 
controls include networking and other socialization processes, teams and taskforces, rituals, 
traditions and ceremonies, organizational culture/values alignment, face-to-face 
communication and participatory decision-making. The respondents were asked to 
indicate the extent to which these control mechanisms were used by their organizations 
to manage a particular inter-firm innovation project.  
Inter-firm innovation project performance captures the degree to which the goals were 
achieved, articulated as: achieving the primary objective, enhancing the organization’s 
competitive position, learning some critical skill(s) or capabilities, and exhibiting higher 
innovation performance compared to competitors. Five items were adapted from Walter et 
al. (2008). 72.966% of common variance was explained by a one factor construct. 
3.2 Control variables 
 




were controlled for the analysis, including sector of the company, size
 
of the company, 
innovation types4, stage of inter-firm innovation, ownership of inter-firm relationship, 
an d ,  prior experience5 with this partner (Chiesa et al., 2009; Davila et al., 2009; 
Dekker, 2008; Luo, 2008)  (see  Table  II).  These control variables were used during data 
analysis as moderating variables for the structural models.  
 




3.3 Tests for potential biases 
 
To test for non-response bias, late responses were compared with early responses by using 
t-tests on all the measurements. No significant differences were found, thus, non-
response bias does not appear to be a concern in the study. To test for the potential of 
social desirability bias, Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality were conducted. The results 
indicated normal distributions and considerable variances in responses for the variables of 
interest. To minimise the likelihood that the respondents provided socially desirable 
answers to the questions, information about anonymity was provided in the cover letter and 
questionnaire. Thus, reasonable steps and tests were undertaken to minimize and detect 
social desirability bias from the respondents. Potential common method bias seems also 
not a concern based on Harman’s (1967) single-factor test with results showing that no 
single factor explains the majority of variance (Dowling, 2009). 
4. Results 
 
Data analysis was conducted by using the structural equation modelling (SEM) with 
the Partial Least Square (PLS) technique (Chin, 1998), which is a component-based SEM 
                                                          
4 Three questions collected information on the nature of innovation and the degree of inter-firm innovation. 
5 We use the stage of innovation as a proxy of the duration of inter-firm relationship and prior experience as an 




technique for analysis of research models with both reflective and formative constructs 
(Gefen and Straub, 2005). The software SmartPLS Version 3.0 was used (Ringle et al., 
2015). 
4.1 Measurement models 
 
Reflective constructs were tested for internal consistency reliability, convergent and 
discriminant validities. As illustrated in Table III, both Cronbach alpha and composite 
reliability scores are above the 0.70 suggested benchmark for internal consistency of a 
reflective construct (Chin, 1998). To assess convergent validity, confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA) was performed by PLS (Davis et al., 2014). Factor loadings for all 
retained items are well above the cut-off of 0.50 and all significant on the intended 
construct (p < 0.001). In addition, average variance extracted (AVE) for these constructs 
exceed the suggested value of 0.50, which also suggests a high level of convergent 
reliability (Chin, 1998). Discriminant validity of reflective constructs was assessed based 
on factor cross-loading and the square root of the AVE statistics. As shown in Tables IV 
and V, all items loaded higher on their own construct than other constructs both 
horizontally and vertically, and each construct shares more variance with its own items 
than other constructs, i ndicating an acceptable degree of discriminant validity (Davis et al., 
2014, Lau and Roopnarain, 2014; Chin, 1998). 
 
 




As the use of formal and social controls was measured as formative constructs, 
common construct validity tests cannot be applied (Petter et al., 2007). As recommended 
by Petter et al. (2007), indicators weights were examined though principal component 




assess the potential problem of multicollinearity, variance inflation factor (VIF) analysis 
was conducted in SPSS 20 by regressing each indicator on the other indicators of 
formative constructs (Davis et al., 2014). The results show all VIF scores are below the 
cut-off value of 3.3, which means that multicollinearity is not a problem with the formative 
constructs (Davis et al., 2014; Petter et al., 2007). 
4.2 Structural models 
 
The structural models were tested by bootstrapping techniques with 1,000 samples 
replacement (Hartmann and Slapničar, 2009). As presented in Figures 2, R
2 
values for the 
use of formal controls, the use of social controls and inter-firm innovation performance 
range from 0.356 to 0.530, which indicate sufficient explanatory power (Chin, 1998).  
As shown in Figure 2, the results show that there is no significant association between asset 
specificity and innovation performance (H1a), however significant negative association (p < 
0.01) exists between uncertainty and innovation performance (H1b), and, significant positive 
association (p < 0.001) is identified between the level of complexity and innovation 
performance (H1c). Hence, this study provides evidence to support H1b and evidence for an 
opposite positive relationship to H1c. The results also reveal that the paths between asset 
specificity and the use of formal and social controls are insignificant. Hence, H2a and 
H2d are not supported. There was also no significant association found between 
uncertainty and the use of formal controls (H2b). The path between uncertainty and the 
use of social controls, however, is significant (p < 0.05), but the co-efficient is -0.170, 
which suggests a negative association between the level of uncertainty and the use of social 
controls. Thus, H2c is also not supported but results suggest an opposite negative 
association. The paths between complexity on the one hand and the use of formal controls 




significant. H2c and H2f are therefore supported. The results also show strong positive 
associations between the use of both formal and social controls and inter-firm 
innovation performance (p < 0.01, p < 0.001), providing evidence to support H3a and 
H3b. 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
 
H4a-H4f predict that the use of formal controls and social controls mediates the relationships 
between asset specificity, uncertainty and complexity on one hand, and the performance of 
inter-firm innovation on the other hand. Additional tests were performed to examine potential 
mediation effects following Baron and Kenny (1986). Two submodels are analyzed using the 
use of formal and social controls as mediators. As shown in Figure 2, the direct model, using 
transaction characteristics (asset specificity, uncertainty and complexity) as independent 
variables and inter-firm innovation project performance as dependent variable, reveals that 
uncertainty is negatively associated with innovation performance (β = -0.352, t = 3.110, p < 
0.01) and complexity is positively associated with innovation performance (β = 0.380, t = 
3.481, p < 0.001). When the use of formal controls is added as mediator, Table 6 shows that 
the direct path coefficients for both uncertainty and complexity to performance are still 
significant (β = 0.319, t = 2.314, p < 0.05; β = 0.257, t = 2.065, p < 0.05). Following Baron 
and Kenny (1986), the results suggest partial mediations only for the use of formal controls. 
This is observed because the relationships between both uncertainty and complexity to 
performance remain significant after the use of formal controls is introduced as a mediator in 
these relationships. The meaningfulness of these partial mediations are assessed by 
decomposing the total effects into direct and indirect effects in Table 6. The indirect effect of 
uncertainty on performance is only 0.032, which is below the meaningful threshold of 0.05 




above the 0.05 meaningful benchmark. Thus, the overall results suggest that the positive 
relationship between complexity and innovation performance is partly due to the use of 
formal controls. Notably, the direct negative association between uncertainty and innovation 
performance becomes significantly positive after taking into account the use of formal 
controls. This result suggests that the use of formal controls may play a vital role in reducing 
uncertainty in inter-firm innovation projects, which could then lead to better innovation 
performance.  
A similar analysis is also conducted for the use of social controls as a mediator on the 
relationships between the project characteristics and innovation performance. The results 
indicate a partial mediation of the use of social controls in the relationship between 
complexity and performance, with an indirect effect of 0.058, which is above the meaningful 
threshold of 0.05. Hence, the total effect on complexity on innovation performance consists 
of a direct effect (β = 0.312, t = 2.621, p < 0.01) and an indirect effect through the use of both 
formal and social controls. Therefore, only H4b, H4c and H4f are supported. The insight 
gained in the use of formal controls impacting on the negative relationship between 
uncertainty and performance is noteworthy.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
Tests on the moderating effects of control variables on the structural models revealed that 
inbound innovation projects (p < 0.05, ß = 0.193) and innovation projects at the stage of 
commercialisation and value capture (p < 0.10, ß = 0.190) are significantly related to higher 
innovation performance. The findings also suggest that innovation projects with more equity 
ownership tend to use more formal controls (p < 0.10, ß = 0.213). No significant differences 







5. Discussion and conclusion 
 
 
This study aimed to examine the direct effects of: 1) asset specificity, uncertainty and 
complexity on the performance of inter-firm innovation projects, and, the use of formal and 
social controls, and, 2) the use of formal and social controls on the performance of inter-
firm innovation projects. The indirect (mediating) effects of the use of formal and social 
controls on the proposed relationships of asset specificity, uncertainty and complexity with 
the performance of inter-firm innovation projects were also investigated. 
The project characteristics of asset specificity, uncertainty and complexity were 
hypothesized as negatively impacting on inter-firm innovation project performance because 
of the appropriation and performance risks that they engendered on performance. Our study 
produced interesting results. Asset specificity was not associated with inter-firm innovation 
project performance. This finding is contradictory to expectations drawn from transaction 
cost economics theory. We explain this result by questioning the relevance of the construct 
of asset specificity at the level of granularity of inter-firm innovation projects. Firstly, whilst 
asset specificity is relevant at an organizational level resulting in organizational mechanisms 
to minimize appropriation risks, we propose that at the level of projects, it may not be a 
foremost concern of team members. Secondly, innovation is about experimentation and 
creativity, suggesting that knowledge that is used to generate innovation may not necessarily 
be dedicated to, and, restricted in its use for, an innovation project. Indeed a project could 
benefit from seemingly disparate human capitals, being brought together and reconfigured to 
produce innovative solutions to problems. Innovation results in new knowledge, an output 
which is embodied in a new product or process. The notion of asset specificity, however, is 




uncertainty had a negative association with performance. We interpret this to mean that 
changes in market/customer requirements could result in innovation project outcomes like a 
new product or service, or process, becoming irrelevant when the product/service is released 
to the market, or the process is implemented in an organization. Contrary to our prediction, 
complexity was positively associated with project performance. In our study, complexity 
was operationalized as the degree of newness of technology, the level and number of skills, 
degree of integration and difficulty in assessing development requirements. Our findings are 
consistent with that of Tatikonda and Rosenthal (2000), where the use of higher levels of 
new technology results in greater achievement of the innovation performance objectives. 
Our study also found evidence to indicate that the use of higher levels of skills will generate 
better innovation outcomes.  
The study also found that asset specificity did not impact on the use of formal and social 
controls. It is plausible that the human capitals and physical assets used for inter-firm 
innovation projects are shared across many projects. Hence, controls to safeguard these assets 
are influenced by factors at a firm/aggregate-level instead of those at project level. In other 
words, the use of shared assets will not have a bearing on the use of specific formal and 
social controls for the project. Uncertainty impacted on the use of social controls but not 
on formal controls. In the context of inter-firm innovation projects, it seems that high 
levels of unpredictability make it very difficult to establish clear specifications, goals and 
outcomes, which form the basis of the use of formal controls. Hence this study finds some 
support for Kang et al. (2014) where it was argued that there may be less emphasis on the 
use of formal controls to manage uncertainty. Notably, we found a contra hypothesis (H2d) 
negative association between uncertainty and the use of social controls at the level of 
innovation projects. Whilst the use of social controls facilitate information sharing to enable 




in regard to innovation projects, an unpredictable context discourages the use of social 
controls. We surmise that project teams in our study do not see the value in using social 
controls to mitigate risks associated with uncertain markets. It is plausible also that whilst 
relevant for project outcomes, controls may be activated at the organizational level instead 
to manage negative risks resulting from uncertainty, say by clarifying customer 
requirements, engaging in further market assessments and the like.  
In regard to complexity, the study’s results suggest that whilst higher levels of integration and 
difficulty in assessing development requirements present challenges to positive outcomes, 
these challenges may be managed and mitigated through the use of both formal and social 
controls. Our sampled organizations activated both impersonal modes of coordination by 
rules, procedures, plans and schedules, and more personal and group-based modes of 
coordination which supports the study by Van de Ven et al. (1976). This finding also 
supports Dekker (2004) who proposed that a set of sophisticated coordination mechanisms of 
both formal and social controls should be mobilized. The use of social controls seems 
particularly relevant in the integration of various skills and assessment of development 
requirements. We propose to reconcile our findings of a negative association between 
uncertainty and the use of social controls, and a positive association between complexity and 
social controls. Whilst managing risks relating to unpredictable market requirements may be 
done at an organizational level, these requirements are translated at a project level as project 
development requirements and here they are managed by using both formal and social 
controls. In regard to social controls, they may be useful in ensuring continued commitment 
amongst team members (Soutar and McNeil, 1993) through improved communication 
(Rundquist, 2012) in the face of difficulty in assessing development requirements.           




success in inter-firm innovation projects ( Davila, 2005). Inter-firm innovation projects, 
indeed requires structures and systems to elevate an exchange of knowledge (Christiansen 
et al., 2013). These findings lend support to assertions by Davila (2005) that different types 
of controls perform specific roles in helping attain success in inter-firm innovation. The 
use of a combination of controls would seem more effective in achieving innovation goals 
than the use of a single type of control (Chen et al., 2009), echoing an observation by Bisbe 
and Malagueño (2009) that a successful innovation project may depend on the activation of 
diverse forms of control, to create a complementary fit (also see Ylinen and Gullkvist, 2014; 
Chen et al., 2009). 
The tests for indirect (mediating) role of the use of formal and social controls in the 
relationships between uncertainty and complexity, and, innovation project performance 
provide useful insights. The role of formal controls in mitigating the effect of uncertainty on 
performance indicates that there is a role for formal controls in managing the risks that 
negatively affect performance. Likewise, the use of both formal and social controls allows 
cutting-edge technology which may be unfamiliar to team members to be successfully 
integrated into new processes, products and services. The use of these controls also help 
facilitate the integration of diverse skill-sets, which are critical to creating innovation. Hence 
the paradox in inter-firm collaboration in innovation projects could be partly and potentially 
be resolved by the use of formal and social controls at project level.          
Our study also found evidence to support a proposition by Davila et al. (2009) which 
predicted that the distinct and non-linear stages of the innovation process are salient. In 
particular, this study found that innovation projects at the stage of commercialisation and 
value capture demonstrated higher performance. This result is unsurprising given that the 




likely contained or resolved at this stage of the project. It also indicates that the longer the 
relationship between the collaborators the higher the likelihood that innovation projects will 
be successful. On could deduce that longer relationships foster an opportunity to learn how 
to adapt to and work with a partner resulting in better outcomes. The findings also suggest 
that innovation projects with more equity ownership tend to use more formal controls. This 
is interpreted to mean that collaborators in inter-firm innovation projects that have a 
financial stake in projects tend to resort to the use of formal mechanisms such as contracts 
and have a stronger focus on outcomes. Test results for the control variables, however, do 
not support Chiesa et al. (2009) which indicated that radical innovation projects require 
different practices. In explaining our contradictory findings, it is noteworthy that the 
aforementioned authors differentiate radical and incremental innovation based on their 
attendant degree of uncertainty and complexity. These elements are already captured in 
the constructs of uncertainty and complexity used in this study. Because radical 
innovation projects are typically characterized by an elevated level of uncertainty in 
their early stage, then our results support Chiesa et al.’s (2009) findings that firms will 
resort to the use of social controls. Thus in future research, it may be useful to focus also if 
not, on the degrees of uncertainty and complexity in innovation projects rather than the 
types and stages of innovation. 
Overall, the study contributed to our understanding of how asset specificity, uncertainty and 
complexity impact on inter-firm innovation project performance. Earlier in the paper, it was 
indicated that risks engendered by high levels of asset specificity, uncertainty and 
complexity may be managed at different levels of organizations. At project level, our study 
found that uncertainty and complexity were relevant to project outcomes. Consequently, the 
use of formal and social controls was dependent on factors that directly impacted and were 




distinctive roles in managing complexity in these projects. In response to Janowicz-
Panjaitan and colleagues (2009), this study does not align with their view that inter-firm 
innovation projects will necessarily require more interpersonal and less formal processes of 
coordination, instead suggesting that they are used complementarily.  
The findings of this study, however, are subject to at least three limitations which could 
be addressed in future research. The first limitation relates to the biases that 
respondents may have had, the size of the sample of respondents and endogeneity of the 
constructs. Whilst precautionary steps were made to limit social desirability bias, there is 
still the possibility of this bias. Despite encouraging results from tests for common method 
bias and the use of single respondents to represent inter-firm projects (see Revilla and 
Knoppen, 2015), there could still be this bias in the data. In future responses from dyads will 
help redress this issue. The sample size of 75 observations of Australian inter-firm 
innovation projects may mean that the study should be replicated in other settings for the 
findings to be empirical generalizable. However, the study’s findings may have theoretical 
generalizability given the literature on the role of risks in performance and the use of formal 
and social controls, and, the role of the use of controls in performance. The cross-sectional 
nature of the data means that causal relationships amongst the variables cannot be 
supported. To support causal relationships, a future study using the case study or 









Asset specificity (AS) 
 
Degree to which the following investments dedicated to this inter-firm innovation could be 
redeployed to other innovation projects or company transactions: 
 
AS1 Human capital (e.g. training, knowledge) (R)*. 
AS2 Brand name capital (R)*. 
AS3 Equipment and other physical assets (R)*. 
AS4 Site or facilities (R)*. 
AS5 Tailored procedures and routines (R)*. 
AS6 Overall, the degree to which investments dedicated to the inter-firm innovation could be 
redeployed is (R)*. 
 





Ability of our company to:  
 
UNT1 Accurately forecast the technical requirements/changes in this innovation (R)*. 
UNT2 Verify whether compliance with established agreements will occur in this inter-firm 
innovation (R)*. 
UNT3 Predict potential cost/benefit ratio for this innovation (R)*. 
UNT4 Anticipate competitors’ reactions to this innovation (R)*. 
UNT5 Anticipate changes in market needs (R)*.   
UNT6 Anticipate other industry changes (e.g. regulatory requirements) (R)*. 
UNT7 Overall, the ability of our company to predict the relevant contingencies relating to this inter-
firm innovation is (R)*. 
 
*Items marked (R) are reversed. 
 
 
Complexity (CMX)  
 
CMX1 Degree of the newness of the technology. 
CMX2 The number of skills or functions involved. 
CMX3 The level of skills or functions required. 
CMX4 The extent of interactions among the different skills or functions. 
CMX5 The extent of integration of different research and development decisions. 
CMX6 Difficulty in assessing development process requirements. 
CMX7 Overall, the level of complexity of this innovation is. 
 
 
The extent to which YOUR COMPANY use the following mechanisms in this inter-firm innovation  
 
Formal controls (FC) 
 
FC1 Contracts 
FC2 Planning and budgeting 
FC3 Standardised procedures and rules. 




FC5 Performance evaluation. 
FC6 Structural grouping and departmentalisation.  
FC7 Management reports. 
 
Social controls (SC) 
 
SC1 Networking and other socialization processes. 
SC2 Teams and taskforces. 
SC3 Transfer of managers/lateral movements. 
SC4 Rituals, traditions and ceremonies. 
SC5 Organisational culture/values alignment. 
SC6 Ad-hoc committees. 
SC7 Face-to-face communication. 
SC8 Participatory decision-making. 
 
 
Innovation project performance (PER)  
 
The degree to which, at the current stage of this inter-firm innovation: 
 
PER1 Our company has achieved its primary objective(s). 
PER2 Our company’s competitive position has been greatly enhanced because of this innovation. 
PER3 Our company has been successful in learning some critical technologies, skills or capabilities 
from this innovation partner. 
PER4 Compared to competitors, our company exhibits a higher level of innovation performance. 







  Frequency Per cent 
Position Top Management 50 66 
 Functional Management 23 31 
 Other 2 3 
Working Experience <3 years 10 13 
 3-10 years 16 21 
 >10 years 49 65 
Gender Male 62 83 
 Female 13 17 





  Frequency Per cent 
Sector Manufacturing 32 42.7 
 Information media and telecommunications 12 16.0 
 Professional, scientific and technical services 12 16.0 
 Retail trade 9 12.0 
 Other 8 10.7 
 Wholesale trade 2 2.7 
Employee Up to 50 11 14.7 
 51-1,000 53 70.7 
 More than 1,000 11 14.7 
Revenue Up to $ 1 million 2 2.7 
 $1-$25 million 28 37.3 
 More than $25 million 43 57.3 
Assets Up to $ 1 million 5 6.7 
 $1-$12.5 million 28 37.3 
 More than $12.5 million 41 54.7 
Nature of innovation Goods and Services Innovation 30 40.0 
 Organizational/Managerial Processes 
Innovation 
10 13.3 
 Operational Processes Innovation 21 28.0 
 Marketing Methods Innovation 10 13.3 
 Other 4 5.3 
Degree of innovation Incremental 62 82.7 
 Radical 13 17.3 
Stage of innovation Intelligence gathering 5 6.7 
 Idea recognition and selection 5 6.7 
 Execution 23 30.7 
 Transition to operations 15 20.0 
 Commercialization and value capture 23 30.7 
 Other 4 5.3 
Previous Experience Yes 31 41.3 
 No 43 57.3 
Ownership No equity 50 66.7 
 Less than 50% equity 5 6.7 
 50% equity 5 6.7 
 More than 50% equity 15 20.0 

















Assets Specificity 0.772 0.839 0.593 
AS1 3.01 1.48 0.623 5.852    
AS2 4.67 1.83 0.599 6.079    
AS3 4.40 1.83 0.707 9.031    
AS4 4.41 1.90 0.746 11.240    
AS5 3.38 1.48 0.573 6.356    
Uncertainty 0.903 0.924 0.635 
UNT1 3.53 1.35 0.730 13.225    
UNT2 3.12 1.45 0.803 21.766    
UNT3 3.32 1.40 0.796 16.118    
UNT4 3.78 1.47 0.728 10.303    
UNT5 3.38 1.31 0.842 21.320    
UNT6 3.69 1.41 0.750 11.895    
Complexity 0.915 0.933 0.665 
CMX1 4.37 1.51 0.804 17.972    
CMX2 4.67 1.45 0.835 15.860    
CMX3 4.73 1.34 0.819 12.861    
CMX4 4.77 1.18 0.799 9.932    
CMX5 4.68 1.36 0.783 16.970    
CMX6 4.40 1.16 0.728 10.590    
Innovation performance 0.918 0.939 0.755 
PER1 4.85 1.45 0.857 23.530    
PER2 4.77 1.48 0.862 25.201    
PER3 5.17 1.32 0.811 16.438    
PER4 4.93 1.53 0.870 26.652    
a All significant at p < 0.001 







AS UNT CMX PER 
AS1 0.623 0.389 -0.349 -0.321 
AS2 0.599 0.250 -0.221 -0.348 
AS3 0.707 0.411 -0.385 -0.374 
AS4 0.746 0.473 -0.397 -0.365 
AS5 0.573 0.373 -0.186 -0.297 
UNT1 0.463 0.730 -0.535 -0.538 
UNT2 0.537 0.803 -0.455 -0.561 
UNT3 0.430 0.796 -0.438 -0.496 
UNT4 0.482 0.728 -0.435 -0.479 
UNT5 0.507 0.842 -0.498 -0.509 
UNT6 0.329 0.750 -0.294 -0.365 
CMX1 -0.384 -0.485 0.804 0.606 
CMX2 -0.415 -0.456 0.835 0.528 
CMX3 -0.366 -0.500 0.819 0.467 
CMX4 -0.338 -0.452 0.799 0.522 
CMX5 -0.372 -0.460 0.783 0.501 
CMX6 -0.398 -0.315 0.728 0.389 
PER1 -0.469 -0.503 0.496 0.857 
PER2 -0.515 -0.611 0.640 0.862 
PER3 -0.407 -0.508 0.543 0.811 
PER4 -0.390 -0.518 0.529 0.870 
AS = assets specificity, UNT = uncertainty, CMX = complexity, PER = innovation 
performance. 








AS UNT CMX PER 
AS 0.690    
UNT 0.599 0.797   
CMX 0.558 0.558 0.815  
PER 0.638 0.636 0.636 0.869 
AS = asset specificity, UNT = uncertainty, CMX = complexity, PER = innovation performance. 
Numbers in bold = square roots of AVEs of constructs. 






















Uncertainty -Formal Control - Innovation performance 0.319 (2.314*) 0.032 (0.662) 0.351 (2.661**) 
Complexity -Formal Control - Innovation performance 0.257 (2.065*) 0.096 (1.255) 0.353 (2.904**) 
    
 







Uncertainty - Social Controls- Innovation performance 0.258 (1.777) 0.074 (1.440) 0.332 (0.560) 
Complexity - Social Controls - Innovation performance 0.312 (2.621**) 0.058 (0.950) 0.371 (2.894**) 
    
All values are standardized coefficients with p value in parentheses. 
* Significant at p < 0.05 (two-tailed). 




























Fig. 1. Conceptual model.  
  
Control variables: 
sector; size; nature, 
























































ns: not significant, * significant at p < 0.05, ** significant at p < 0.01, *** significant at p < 0.001. 
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